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The British Army, Information Management and the First World War 
Revolution in Military Affairs 
 
 
ABSTRACT Information Management (IM) – the systematic ordering, processing 
and channelling of information within organisations – forms a critical component of 
modern military command and control systems. As a subject of scholarly enquiry, 
however, the history of military IM has been relatively poorly served. Employing new 
and under-utilised archival sources, this article takes the British Expeditionary Force 
(BEF) of the First World War as its case study and assesses the extent to which its IM 
system contributed to the emergence of the modern battlefield in 1918. It argues that the 
demands of fighting a modern war resulted in a general, but not universal, improvement 
in the BEF’s IM techniques, which in turn laid the groundwork, albeit in embryonic 
form, for the IM systems of modern armies. 
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In November 1915 the future novelist and playwright J.B. Priestley, then a lance-corporal, 
was sent to work as a temporary clerk on the operations staff of the British Expeditionary 
Force’s (BEF’s) III Corps. Summing up his two-week ‘ordeal’, Priestley felt he had been 
‘trapped in the middle of what seemed a huge idiotic system… committed to wasting men 
and time and money collecting and receiving and distributing and filing unnecessary 
information’.1 Echoing Priestley’s sentiments, in a letter to his wife in January 1916 
Cuthbert Headlam reflected upon the nature of his work as a General Staff Officer 3rd Grade 
(GSO3) on the operations staff at Second Army headquarters: 
 
[T]he work is purely clerical – so far as I am concerned up to now at any rate – 
and not at all difficult if one were left to do it in one’s own way and to make 
one’s own decisions… But this is exactly what one is never allowed to do – 
every silly little matter has to be looked at by half a dozen different officers – 
and in the end it is so fingered and thumbed that one ceases to recognize it when 
                                                 
1 J.B. Priestley, Margin Released: A Writer’s Reminiscences and Reflections (London: Mercury Books, 1962), 
104. For additional context, see Neil Hanson with Tom Priestley (eds.), Priestley’s Wars (Ilkley: Great 
Northern Books, 2008). 
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it is suddenly thrown back to one and asked where it came from. It is all 
dreadfully childish, old fashioned and bureaucratic. 
 
Dissatisfied with being ‘a glorified office boy’, in March Headlam was transferred to Second 
Army’s counter-espionage staff before being upgraded as a GSO2 and reassigned to the 
intelligence branch of VIII Corps in November. However, during his time there Headlam 
again wrote frequently about the disorder and inefficiency of office procedures, remarking 
that ‘not one Staff Officer per cent out of those whom I have met has the vaguest idea about 
how an office ought to be run, or the remotest conception of what is meant by delegation of 
authority or division of labour’.2  
Priestley and Headlam’s experiences are intriguing, for they provide rare insights into 
the internal modus operandi of the BEF’s command and control system, which itself has 
formed part of the enduring controversy surrounding British military operations during the 
First World War. William Philpott has provided a useful synthesis of the ongoing debate: 
 
For several decades military historians in Britain have been re-examining myths 
and misperceptions about the British army’s effectiveness on the battlefield… 
This historical revisionism began with the identification and consideration of the 
concept of a ‘learning curve’ of improving British military performance from the 
army’s early and costly trench battles of 1915 and 1916… to the successful 
British advance and defeat of the German army in 1918. While the concept of a 
learning curve is now considered too simplistic, studying the process by which 
the British army adapted to modern industrialised warfare has been the 
predominant trend in Anglophone military history of the war since the 1990s… 
                                                 
2 Letters to Beatrice, 13/14 January, 28 February, 17 November 1916; 7 February, 26 May 1917, in Jim Beach 
(ed.), The Military Papers of Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Cuthbert Headlam 1910-1942 (Stroud: History Press for 
the Army Records Society, 2010), 115, 117, 149, 156-7, 167. 
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[T]he most recent tendency, which has yet to produce definite findings, has been 
to examine the processes of institutional learning and adaptation that allowed the 
army to rise to the challenges of modern war.3 
 
Although scholarship has moved away from the rather stale debate on generalship and 
towards an examination of neglected military support functions such as logistics, intelligence 
and staff work,4 as well as investigating the BEF’s methods for learning,5 there remains a 
significant gap in our understanding of one of the British army’s most important command 
and control components, namely its communications and information system (CIS).6  
While recent research has begun to correct this anomaly,7 discussions on 
communications invariably focus on how, and with what success, information was 
transmitted and received on the battlefield.8 To date, however, no historian has made a 
detailed attempt to consider what happened to this information both immediately before it 
was transmitted and once it reached its intended destination. This is a significant oversight, 
not only in light of the prodigious volume of information generated by the mass armies of 
the era, but also because today’s armed forces recognise that information on its own is 
                                                 
3 William Philpott, ‘Military History a Century after the Great War’, Revue Française de Civilisation 
Britannique [Online] 20/1 (2015), 2-3, < https://rfcb.revues.org/288 >. 
4 Ian Malcolm Brown, British Logistics on the Western Front 1914-1919 (Westport, CT.: Praeger, 1998); Jim 
Beach, Haig’s Intelligence: GHQ and the German Army, 1916-1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2013); Paul 
Harris, The Men Who Planned the War: A Study of the Staff of the British Army on the Western Front, 1914-
1918 (London: Ashgate, 2016). 
5 Robert T. Foley, ‘Dumb Donkeys or Cunning Foxes? Learning in the British and German Armies during the 
Great War’, International Affairs 90/2 (2014), 279-98; Aimée Fox, Learning to Fight: Military Innovation and 
Change in the British Army, 1914-1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2018). 
6 Defined as ‘the assembly of equipment, methods and procedures, and if necessary personnel, organised so as 
to accomplish specific information, conveyance and processing functions’. JDP 6-00 (Third Edition), 
Communications and Information Systems Support to Joint Operations (January 2008), 1-1. 
7 Brian N. Hall, Communications and British Operations on the Western Front, 1914-1918 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 2017).  
8 R.E. Priestley, Work of the Royal Engineers in the European War, 1914-19: The Signal Service (France) (first 
published 1921; new ed., Uckfield: The Naval and Military Press Ltd., 2006); Bill Rawling, ‘Communications 
in the Canadian Corps, 1915-1918: Wartime Technological Progress Revisited’, Canadian Military History 3/2 
(1994), 6-21; Mike Bullock and Laurence A. Lyons, Missed Signals on the Western Front: How the Slow 
Adoption of Wireless Restricted British Strategy and Operations in World War I (Jefferson, NC.: McFarland & 
Company, 2010). 
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meaningless unless they have efficient arrangements in place for ordering, processing and 
channelling it.9 According to current British military doctrine, the ability to accurately and 
rapidly convert information into knowledge, and then knowledge into action – what is 
referred to as information management (IM) – ‘underpins the successful prosecution of 
military operations’ by providing ‘exploitable information on time, in the right place and 
format, to maximise freedom of action’, enabling ‘effective information exploitation and the 
achievement of situational awareness by commanders and staffs’.10 Representing the point 
where command, staff work and signals converge, IM thus constitutes a critical function of 
modern military command and control systems.11 
Indeed, since the early 1990s it has become fashionable to argue that unprecedented 
developments in digital communications and data processing technologies have led the 
armed forces of several Western states to undergo an information-based Revolution in 
Military Affairs (RMA).12 Although the RMA remains a much contested concept,13 
historians have nonetheless attempted to identify past examples of RMAs and assess the 
extent that these RMAs depended on their information resources.14 So far, however, there 
has been no detailed exploration of military IM techniques during the First World War,15 the 
conflict which, according to some historians, witnessed the most important RMA to date: an 
                                                 
9 Theo Farrell, ‘The Dynamics of British Military Transformation’, International Affairs 84/4 (2008), 777-807; 
Jim Storr, The Human Face of War (London: Continuum, 2009), 129-54. 
10 JDP 6-00, Communications, 1-1. For the US perspective, see Joint Publication 6-0, Joint Communications 
System (June 2015), < http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp6_0.pdf >.  
11 David S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes, Understanding Command and Control (Washington: CCRP, 2006), 
123-50. For a non-military perspective, see Matthew Hinton (ed.), Introducing Information Management: the 
Business Approach (Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2005). 
12 See, in particular, Journal of Strategic Studies 33/4 (2010), Special Issue: The Information Technology 
Revolution in Military Affairs. 
13 Jeffrey Collins and Andrew Futter (eds.), Reassessing the Revolution in Military Affairs: Transformation, 
Evolution and Lessons Learnt (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), esp. 175-80. 
14 Emily O. Goldman (ed.), Information and Revolutions in Military Affairs (London: Routledge, 2005). 
15 Other organisations have been the subject of enquiry: Alistair Black and Rodney Brunt, ‘Information 
Management in Business, Libraries and British Military Intelligence: Towards a History of Information 
Management’, Journal of Documentation 55/4 (1999), 361-74. 
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artillery-centred, combined-arms revolution, giving birth to ‘the Modern Style of Warfare’,16 
whereby battles are ‘synchronised and sequenced across space and time to form a coherent 
campaign which seeks, within the context of a wider strategy, to destroy the enemy’s ability 
to resist by destroying his assets, his will to fight or his capacity to react’.17 
Using the BEF as a case study, therefore, this article has the opportunity to position 
the subject of IM within the wider context of the debates concerning the British army’s 
learning processes and the First World War RMA, assessing the extent to which information 
resources contributed to the emergence of the modern battlefield in 1918. It is important to 
stress that this article draws a distinction between ‘information’ and ‘intelligence’; the 
former ‘refers to the location and activities of friendly troops’, while the latter ‘is the order 
of battle, dispositions and possible intentions of the enemy’.18 Within this context, the pre-
war British army Field Service Regulations identified five different forms that information 
on active operations could take: standing orders; routine orders; operation orders; messages; 
and reports.19 The analysis within this article will be directed predominantly towards the 
latter three, which deal with more time-sensitive and tactical/operational information, rather 
than the former two which are more administrative in nature.20 
                                                 
16 Jonathan Bailey, ‘The First World War and the Birth of Modern Warfare’, in MacGregor Knox and 
Williamson Murray (eds.), The Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300-2050 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
2001), 132-53; Colin S. Gray, Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History 
(London: Routledge, 2004), 170-221; Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in 
Modern Battle (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2004), 28-51. 
17 Jonathan Boff, Winning and Losing on the Western Front: The British Third Army and the Defeat of 
Germany in 1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2012), 5. 
18 Dominick Graham and Shelford Bidwell, Coalitions, Politicians and Generals: Some Aspects of Command 
in Two World Wars (London: Brassey’s, 1993), 29-30. For the BEF’s intelligence processing methods, see 
Beach, Haig’s Intelligence, 168-91. 
19 Field Service Regulations Part I: Operations (1909) (Reprinted, with Amendments, October 1914) (London: 
General Staff, War Office, 1914), 25-37. 
20 For an aspect of the administrative processing techniques of the army, see John Black, ‘Behind the Scenes 
with the Pen and Ink Corps! The Role of the Army Pay Services during the Great War in Maintaining the 
Loyalty of the Fighting Soldier and Preserving the Social Fabric of the United Kingdom’, War & Society 35/3 
(2016), 180-203. 
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This article makes use of new and under-utilised British, Australian, Canadian and 
American archival sources in order to assess how, and to what extent, the BEF’s IM system 
evolved during the course of the war. It begins by examining the state of IM within the 
British army at the turn of the twentieth century, comparing it with the wider developments 
that were occurring within the commercial and industrial sectors. It then examines the 
challenges that the war on the Western Front posed for the army’s IM system, before 
assessing how well the system adapted to overcome them. The evidence presented here 
suggests that the demands of fighting a modern, industrialised war resulted in a general, but 
not universal, improvement in the BEF’s IM techniques, which in turn laid the groundwork, 
be it in embryonic form, for the IM systems of modern armies. 
 
Pre-war Developments 
The British army’s IM system upon the outbreak of war in 1914 was very much the product 
of the democratic and industrial revolutions of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
which had not only increased the size, firepower and mobility of military organisations but 
also brought about the bureaucratisation of command and control.21 This bureaucratisation 
was symptomatic of a wider trend that was occurring throughout Western society, the 
primary characteristics of which were the shift from personal to impersonal control; strict 
discipline, rules and procedures; the specialisation and division of labour; the development 
of managerial hierarchies; and the development of increasingly elaborate and intensive 
systems for collecting, storing and processing information. According to the German 
sociologist Max Weber, the chief cause of the growth of bureaucracy was the huge increase 
                                                 
21 Christopher Dandeker, Surveillance, Power and Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), 82-90. 
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in the size and complexity of the administrative tasks created by new communication and 
information technologies.22 
The proliferation of commerce and the growth in the size of businesses and the 
number of workers they employed resulted in an ever-greater need for communication and a 
dramatic increase in the volume of information generated. This necessitated changes not 
only to the way businesses were managed but also the manner in which information was 
gathered, processed and disseminated.23 According to one historian, ‘internal communication 
came to serve as a mechanism for managerial coordination and control of organizations’. 
The emphasis on informal oral communication gradually gave way to ‘a complex and 
extensive formal communication system depending heavily on written documents of various 
sorts’.24 From the 1870s, American businesses experienced an information revolution in 
which new equipment and techniques ‘transformed the office and the way firms dealt with 
information’.25 The introduction of new ‘bureau technologies’, such as typewriters, 
telephones and punched-card tabulating machines, combined with new techniques for 
handling information, such as pre-printed standard forms and vertical filing systems, enabled 
offices to process vast quantities of information more speedily and with greater efficiency.26 
Yet the growth in the development and adoption of new office machinery in the US was not 
                                                 
22 James Beniger, The Control Revolution: Technological and Economic Origins of the Information Society 
(Cambridge, MA.: Harvard UP, 1986), 6-16. For an interesting take on how these new communication 
technologies and associated bureaucratic infrastructures created the ‘technostate’, which in turn facilitated 
enhanced modes of liberal governance, see Patrick Joyce, The State of Freedom: A Social History of the British 
State since 1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2013). 
23 Youssef Cassis, Big Business: The European Experience in the Twentieth Century (Oxford: Oxford UP, 
1997), 160-4; Edward Higgs, The Information State in England (London: Palgrave, 2004), 12. 
24 JoAnne Yates, Control through Communication: The Rise of System in American Management (Baltimore: 
John Hopkins UP, 1993), xv. 
25 JoAnne Yates, ‘Evolving Information Use in Firms, 1850-1920: Ideology and Information Techniques and 
Technologies’, in Lisa Bud-Frierman (ed.), Information Acumen: The Understanding and Use of Knowledge in 
Modern Business (London: Routledge, 1994), 26. 
26 John Orbell, ‘The Development of Office Technology’, in Alison Turton (ed.), Managing Business Archives 
(London: Butterworth-Heinrmann, 1991), 60-83; Arthur L. Norberg, ‘High Technology Calculation in the 
Early 20th Century: Punched Card Machinery in Business and Government’, Technology and Culture 31/4 
(1990), 753-79. 
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replicated to the same degree on the other side of the Atlantic. Although large-scale offices 
in Britain had developed much earlier than in the US, they became mechanised much later.27 
Instead, IM in British business was defined by a specialisation of clerical function.28 The 
information systems of leading banks, insurance firms and rail companies relied principally 
upon hundreds of well-trained and experienced clerks, processing every transaction by hand, 
using steel nib and paper, with little help from new office machinery.29 
Yet it was not just the commercial and industrial sectors that were affected by this IM 
revolution. As armies became larger and more complex, the more they too began to invest in 
the structures and techniques of the bureaucratic age. In conjunction with the railway, the 
employment of the electric telegraph helped facilitate the movement and control of ever 
larger armies over greater distances.30 Not only did the telegraph help to centralise command 
and control but, as an electronic means of ‘real-time’ communication, it brought with it a 
huge increase in the volume of correspondence. During the course of the Second Boer War 
(1899-1902), the British army transmitted over 13.5 million telegrams.31 Such a prodigious 
quantity of information necessitated an efficient system for processing and disseminating it, 
and the development of new organisations to undertake such tasks. The two most important 
in this regard were the General Staff and the Signal Service, established in 1906 and 1912, 
                                                 
27 Alistair Black, Dave Muddiman and Helen Plant, The Early Information Society: Information Management 
in Britain before the Computer (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 12-26. 
28 Martin Campbell-Kelly, ‘Data Processing and Technological Change: The Post Office Savings Bank, 1861-
1930’, Technology and Culture 39/1 (1998), 1-32; idem, ‘Information Technology and Organisational Change 
in the British Census, 1801-1911’, in JoAnne Yates and John Van Maanen (eds.), Information Technology and 
Organizational Transformation: History, Rhetoric, and Practice (London: Sage, 2001), 35-58. 
29 Martin Campbell-Kelly, ‘The Railway Clearing House and Victorian Data Processing’, in Bud-Frierman 
(ed.), Information Acumen, 51-74. 
30 Martin van Creveld, Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to the Present (New York: Free Press, 1989), 
153-66. 
31 Edward Spiers, The Late Victorian Army 1868-1902 (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1992), 322. 
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respectively.32 Both, however, were late developments when compared to the US and 
German armies.33 
Consequently, while part of the reason for Britain’s supposed decline in economic 
predominance during this period derived from its outmoded form of business organisation,34 
the patchy performance of the British army during the Boer War can also be attributed partly 
to its reluctance to accept the bureaucratic structures and administrative techniques required 
to wage modern warfare.35 Leopold Amery, war correspondent for The Times, for instance, 
noted that during the Battle of Spion Kop (23-24 January 1900): 
 
Nobody… made any real, determined effort to transmit information or to 
discover what was happening… The systematic repetition of every message by 
several orderlies was not attempted, and, indeed, short as were the distances 
involved, messages by hand seem in many cases to have taken quite inordinate 
times to reach their destination.36  
 
The defective transmission of information throughout the battle confirmed ‘how inherently 
unreliable and subject to accidents’ the British IM system was.37 These problems persisted 
during yearly manoeuvres after the war. In July 1905, one officer complained that the army’s 
                                                 
32 David French and Brian Holden Reid (eds.), The British General Staff: Reform and Innovation, 1890-1939 
(London: Routledge, 2002); Major-General R.F.H. Nalder, The Royal Corps of Signals: A History of its 
Antecedents and Development, 1800-1955 (London: Royal Signals Institution, 1958), 16-17. 
33 Rebecca Robbins Raines, Getting the Message Through: A Branch History of the US Army Signal Corps 
(Washington, D.C.: Centre of Military History, 1999), 3-8; Major Paul W. Evans, ‘Strategic Signal 
Communication: A Study of Signal Communication as Applied to Large Field Forces, Based Upon the 
Operations of the German Signal Corps During the March on Paris in 1914’, Signal Corps Bulletin 82 (1935), 
24-58; Arden Bucholz, Moltke, Schlieffen and Prussian War Planning (Oxford: Berg, 1993). 
34 Stephen Broadberry and Sayantan Ghosal, ‘From Counting House to the Modern Office: Explaining Anglo-
American Productivity Differences in Services, 1870-1990’, Journal of Economic History 62/4 (2002), 967-98. 
For a contrasting perspective, see David Edgerton, Science, Technology and the British Industrial ‘Decline’, 
1870-1970 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996). 
35 David French, The British Way in Warfare, 1688-2000 (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990), 155. 
36 L.S. Amery, The Times’ History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902, Vol. III (London: Sampson Low, 
1902), 298-301. 
37 Colonel Hubert du Cane (trans.), The War in South Africa: the Advance to Pretoria after Paardeberg, the 
Upper Tugela Campaign, etc. Prepared in the Historical Section of the Great General Staff, Berlin (London: 
John Murray, 1906), 169.  
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system of correspondence was ‘laborious and tedious’, noting that the ‘over-lapping’ of 
office work, ‘unnecessary waste of clerical labour’ and ‘cumbrous filing and registering 
procedures’ had led to ‘a loss of speed and efficiency’ in processing information.38 These 
were flaws that could no longer be ignored. As the 1909 Field Service Regulations made 
clear: ‘Timely information… is an essential factor of success in war’. Moreover: 
 
The value of information depends to a great extent on the length of time that has 
elapsed since the events occurred to which it relates. It is of the first importance 
that information should be communicated with the least possible delay to the 
commanders for whose benefit it is intended… [T]he means of communication 
[should be] so organised as to ensure the rapid transmission of information.39 
 
Thus, the army’s IM system became the subject of much discussion in the years 
leading up to the First World War. The arrangements for handling incoming and outgoing 
correspondence within the General Headquarters (GHQ) General Staff (G) Branch, for 
example, were outlined formally in the 1912 Staff Manual (War).40 Separate from the 
Adjutant General’s (A) Branch and the Quartermaster General’s (Q) Branch, which dealt 
with administration and supply, respectively, G Branch was responsible for the planning and 
implementation of operations, the issuing of orders and the collection and dissemination of 
intelligence.41 It was divided into two sections: Operations (O) and Intelligence (I). The 
Operations Section consisted of two sub-sections, O(a) and O(b). O(a) was responsible for 
                                                 
38 Captain H. Musgrave, ‘The Army System of Correspondence’, Royal Engineers Journal 2/1 (1905), 47-51. 
39 Field Service Regulations Part I, 119, 130. 
40 Staff Manual (War) (London: General Staff, War Office, 1912), WO32/4731, The National Archives (TNA), 
Kew.  
41 Field Service Regulations Part II: Organization and Administration (1909) (Reprinted, with Amendments, 
October 1914) (London: General Staff, War Office, 1914), 38-41. For additional context, see Dan Todman, 
‘The Grand Lamasery Revisited: General Headquarters on the Western Front, 1914-1918’, in Gary Sheffield 
and Dan Todman (eds.), Command and Control on the Western Front: The British Army’s Experience 1914-18 
(Staplehurst: Spellmount, 2004), 39-70. 
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planning operations, drafting plans and orders, and for intercommunication, while O(b) was 
charged with registering and filing all correspondence. From the details contained within the 
Staff Manual (War) and from the subsequent reports pertaining to the 1913 army exercises, 
an outline of the way in which information was channelled and processed through G Branch 
can be made (Figure 1). 
As smooth as the mechanisms of G Branch appeared on paper, in practice, at both a 
test exercise at the Royal Military College in January 1913 and at army manoeuvres in the 
autumn, a number of flaws were revealed. Sir John French, who acted in the dual capacity as 
director and commander at the test exercise, complained that ‘[i]n a large and complicated 
organisation such as General Headquarters’ there was a ‘delay in important information 
reaching higher authorities, and of action being taken by subordinates’. He stressed that the 
work allotted to O(b) was particularly heavy.42 The autumn manoeuvres confirmed the 
problems experienced at the beginning of the year: the poor flow of information throughout 
the branch; the lack of coordination between the Operations and Intelligence Sections; an 
uncertainty as to how messages should be sent by the Signal Service; and, confusion about 
the registration and filing of correspondence.43 According to one staff captain, ‘on average it 
took some 40-60 minutes to get operation orders typed, hectographed and ready for 
despatch’.44 Things were little better at another staff exercise which took place at Camberley 
in early 1914. Sir James Edmonds, the British official historian, alleges in his memoirs that 
Sir Henry Wilson’s poor performance as Chief of Staff caused Sir William Robertson to 
whisper to Sir John French: ‘If you go to war with that operations staff, you are as good as 
                                                 
42 ‘Report of a Conference of General Staff Officers at the Royal Military College, 13th to 16th January, 1913’, 
29, WO279/48, TNA.  
43 ‘Notes by Lt-Col. Bird and Maj. Evans on the Working of Ob during the Army Exercise 1913’, 3 October 
1913, WO32/4731, ‘Notes by O(b) General Headquarters. Brown Force. On Army Exercise 1913’, 1 October 
1913, ‘Sub-Section O(a). Office Arrangements’, 20 October 1913, WO106/51, TNA. 
44 ‘Notes on Work at General Headquarters, by Capt. Ommanney’, 22 October 1913, WO32/4731, TNA. The 
hectograph was a device that used a gelatine bed or roll to transfer aniline dye from an original document to up 
to 100 copies. Yates, Control through Communication, 50. 
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beaten’.45 Although it was clear that the IM system outlined in the Staff Manual (War) 
needed to be revised, the staff exercise in early 1914 was to prove the last opportunity to test 
the inner-workings of GHQ. Consequently, many of the difficulties encountered during 
1913-14 were to resurface during the opening stages of the war. 
 
1914-1918: Challenges 
Indeed, problems emerged as soon as the 1914 campaign was underway. According to one 
GHQ staff officer: ‘Difficulties in mobilization, ignorance of each others duties and 
functions, [and] a tendency to work in watertight compartments made the machine groan and 
creak considerably’. Messages were often despatched without full knowledge of the situation 
and ‘the crowded room of O(a) with many persons talking and no one apparently giving a 
decision produced a feeling akin to despair among the junior members of the Operations 
Section’.46 These problems were repeated elsewhere. The staff and signallers in II Corps, for 
example, struggled to perform their duties on account of having had no pre-war experience 
working together.47 According to one senior signal officer: ‘The work seemed to want a little 
“oiling” at first, owing to the usual staff being augmented and changed, and consequently the 
work was strange to the majority’.48 A similar situation confronted many Territorial and New 
Army divisions as the BEF grew during 1915-16.49 Consequently, with even ‘the most 
competent officers… working on a scale and in conditions of which they had no experience’, 
                                                 
45 Unpublished Memoirs, 15, Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds Papers III/7, Liddell Hart Centre for 
Military Archives (LHCMA), King’s College London. 
46 Peter T. Scott (ed.), ‘The View from GHQ: The Second Part of the War Diary of General Sir Charles 
Deedes’, Stand To! Journal of the Western Front Association 11 (1984), 9. For additional context, see Nikolas 
Gardner, Trial by Fire: Command and the British Expeditionary Force in 1914 (Westport, CT.: Praeger, 2003). 
47 J.P. Harris, Douglas Haig and the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2008), 65-6. 
48 Brigadier-General A.B.R. Hildebrand, ‘Second Army Signals, 1914: From the Personal Diary of Brigadier-
General A.B.R. Hildebrand’, Royal Signals Quarterly Journal 6/21 (1938), 131.  
49 K.W. Mitchinson, The Territorial Force at War, 1914-16 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Peter 
Simkins, Kitchener’s Army: The Raising of the New Armies 1914-1916 (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1988). 
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many ‘blunders and omissions’ occurred during the first half of the war.50 During the course 
of the Somme campaign, one divisional commander complained that because ‘officers of the 
New Army take more time to digest orders and to pass them on to those who have to act on 
them… in many cases operation orders from higher formations reach Divisional 
Headquarters 2 hours or less before they have to be acted upon’. Consequently, not only was 
it often ‘too late to act on them’ but, as another divisional commander observed, the time 
delay in getting orders forward ‘resulted more than once in futile loss of life’.51 
Furthermore, ‘the rapid rise of both Commanders and Staff Officers with absolutely 
no Staff experience’ contributed to a highly centralised IM system in which many regular 
officers displayed an open lack of confidence in their civilian subordinates.52 Upon his move 
to Second Army headquarters, Cuthbert Headlam was told by his commanding officer that 
his predecessor ‘was not a [regular] soldier – so of course he did not understand the filing of 
documents and proper ways of carrying on’.53 Similarly, Walter Nicholson testified after the 
war that ‘“G” had ever a curious dislike of delegating responsibilities’.54 This level of 
prejudice filtered down to the lower levels of command. In October 1916, for example, 
James Jack was asked by a fellow battalion commander why he continued to draft all 
important orders and reports himself, even though he had an adjutant to undertake such 
work. ‘The reason’, Jack replied, ‘is that I know precisely what I want written, and find it 
easier and quicker to express it personally than to correct the manuscript of another’.55 
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It was not just inexperience that created problems. The enormous growth of the BEF, 
from six infantry divisions and one cavalry division totalling 150,000 men in 1914, to a peak 
force of 66 divisions numbering over two million men in 1918,56 brought with it a dramatic 
increase in the volume of information generated. This in turn necessitated an IM system 
which could collect, process and disseminate information ‘on an immense and elaborate 
scale’.57 Telegraphically and telephonically, GHQ was ‘the nerve-centre of the British 
Army’s activities’. As one signal officer recalled, the telephone traffic at GHQ ‘was heavy, 
the calling-rate high, the holding time long, and the peak loads occurred at unforeseen 
times’.58 Throughout 1916, the average delay on the telephone lines from GHQ was two 
minutes to the frontline, 15 minutes to the Channel bases and 20 minutes to London.59 
During the final four months of the war, GHQ’s signal office handled an average of 6,500 
telegrams and 850 telephone calls per day.60 These figures reveal exactly what was required 
to operate what one officer described as ‘a far bigger and more intricate business than any 
industrial concern in peace-time’.61 
Given the prodigious volume of information passing over the army’s 
communications system, an array of problems emerged which were by no means confined to 
GHQ. For example, XIII Corps Signal Company handled 2,980 telegrams and 1,400 
despatch rider messages during the opening 24 hours of the Somme. Combined with the 726 
telephone calls taken during the first 12 hours of the attack, the operating staff at the signal 
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office ‘were called upon to work long hours at high pressure’.62 During the Battle of 
Cambrai in November 1917, 20th Division’s signal office processed over 2,000 messages per 
day which ‘severely taxed the powers of the Signal Company’.63 Similarly, on several 
occasions during 2nd Australian Division’s operations in October 1918, the telephone and 
telegraph circuits ‘became “choked” resulting in delays to “Urgent Operation” and “Priority” 
messages’.64  
 Adding to the pressure of the work performed by signal office personnel was the fact 
that ‘considerable time was spent in transmitting multiple addresses at the end of telegrams 
to each recipient of the message’.65 In 1916, XIII Corps complained that many of the 
telegrams it dealt with were far too long, calling for ‘an elimination of unnecessary words’ to 
speed the process up. Congestion was also regularly experienced at its telephone exchange 
where operators had been inundated with calls ‘which are by no means necessary’.66 
Similarly, at Messines the following year it was found that the ‘urgent operation priority’ 
prefix defeated itself because every officer considered their messages to be ‘urgent operation 
priority’.67 Even as late as June 1918, a Third Army memorandum warned that its signal 
company was being over-worked and rapid-intercommunication impeded because ‘the rules 
laid down… as to the correct use of the telegraph and telephones and [Despatch Rider Letter 
Service were] not being followed’. It calculated that 10 per cent of telegraph messages were 
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unnecessary and that 25 per cent of words within messages ‘might be omitted without 
altering the sense’.68 
 A signal office was therefore ‘anything but… tranquil’.69 One officer, for instance, 
described 40th Division’s signal office in September 1918 as ‘a buzzing hive of industry’, 
where personnel worked long hours and under strenuous conditions.70 From observing 
British and French operations in early 1918, a US Army Signal School report stated that ‘six 
hours a day at the instrument out of twenty-four is considered as the maximum for ordinary 
conditions’. Of the remaining 18 hours, ‘operators not on duty should be required to spend 
five or six hours on repair and upkeep of lines and other odd jobs connected with signal 
work’.71 According to one NCO employed at Fourth Army’s signal office during 1916: ‘It is 
too much like the usual routine of office work, without any comfort and a marked lack of 
outdoor exercise’.72  
 Frontline signal offices were also under the added pressure of being targeted by 
enemy artillery.73 It was paramount, therefore, that signal offices were suitably positioned. 
Prior to the Battle of the Somme, Fourth Army issued instructions which stipulated that 
signal offices were ‘not to be placed in close proximity to guns, or where it is likely to be 
subjected to hostile shelling, and where it will be found impossible to use the telephone on 
account of the noise’.74 Similarly, American observations of British and French operations 
led them to conclude that ‘Signal Stations must be afforded the best possible protection 
against shell fire and should be installed in the deepest dugouts available’. They were to be 
                                                 
68 ‘Third Army No. G.34/659’, 4 June 1918, RG9-III-C-5/4443/7/6, Library and Archives Canada (LAC), 
Ottawa. 
69 Hildebrand, ‘Second Army Signals’, 135. 
70 Diary entry, 30 September 1918, Second-Lieutenant H.A.J. Lamb Papers, PP/MCR/187, IWM. 
71 ‘Lecture No. 33. Trench Signal Stations’, 1 May 1918, AEF Army Signal School Files, RG120/405/1794, 
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Maryland.   
72 ‘The Great War Diaries of a Signalman’, 9 July 1916, Stapleton Eachus Papers, 01/51/1, IWM.  
73 Lieutenant W.J. Gwilliam, ‘A Signal Master on Active Service’, Post Office Electrical Engineers’ Journal 8 
(1915-16), 262. 
74 ‘Notes of a Conference Held at Army Headquarters on 16 April 1916’, Fourth Army Records, Vol. 1, IWM. 
 17 
‘placed in positions where they will attract as little attention from the enemy as possible’, 
and be ‘properly protected from the effects of gas by utilising gas blankets’ and by 
‘compartmentalising the office’.75 This was often easier said than done. Many forward signal 
offices found it impossible to escape enemy attention, often with tragic consequences. As 
Reginald Kentish, GOC 76th Infantry Brigade, recalled at the end of July 1916:  
 
Throughout the operations my Headquarters were heavily shelled… Owing to 
this very heavy shell fire, accompanied as it was by gas and lachrymatory shells, 
I was compelled to evacuate Headquarters. My Brigade Major was placed hors 
de combat from the effects of the gas, my Signal Officer was killed and several 
of my Staff killed and wounded. All my communications were cut.76 
 
In light of such occurrences, commanders at all levels experienced the extraordinary 
difficulty of obtaining prompt and reliable information. As a frustrated Sir Douglas Haig told 
Claud Jacob, GOC II Corps, in August 1916, ‘information from divisions frequently reaches 
HQs of corps, armies and GHQ very slowly. Too slowly!’77 How, and with what success, 
then, did the BEF attempt to overcome these problems? 
 
1914-1918: Adaptation 
Owing to the scale and intensity of trench warfare and the increasing number of formations 
in the field, the mounting volume of information generated by the BEF necessitated changes 
to its IM system. As James Jack noted in October 1916: ‘The amount of office work is 
inconceivable. One can now comprehend the significance of the dictum, “the pen is mightier 
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than the sword”, as the swords are dying or becoming worn out while the pens keep driving 
on with increasing rapidity’.78 One such change involved the proliferation of modern bureau 
technologies, such as typewriters and duplicating machines, and the introduction of new 
processing techniques, such as card index filing systems, in order to improve the speed and 
efficiency of office work. As Sydney Partridge, the Director of Army Printing and Stationary 
Services, noted in March 1916: 
 
The written message has replaced the verbal message; the duplicator and 
typewriter have eliminated altogether the group of “copyists”; the Sunprinting 
Apparatus has reduced the number of draughtsmen; the “Addressograph” has cut 
down the “Despatch Room” by 90%; the “Dictaphone” has replaced the 
shorthand writer; and the Calculator and Comptometer have revolutionised the 
Counting House. 
 
Partridge concluded that it was the duty of every unit ‘seeking efficiency and economy in 
office administration to strike the balance between the “human” and the “mechanical”, yet 
the more efficiently a Department is organised the greater will be the tendency for 
“mechanical” to encroach on “human” territory’.79 As early as December 1914, for instance, 
Partridge had noted that there was already ‘a great demand for typewriting machines and 
duplicating apparatus for units with the Expeditionary Force’.80 To place the significance of 
these demands into context, in the aftermath of the army manoeuvres that had taken place 
just over a year previously, Sir Henry Wilson had complained about the shortage of pencils 
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for the General Staff office at GHQ.81 However, typewriters were expensive and in early 
1915, with supply unable to meet demand, all requests had to be ‘supported by definite 
reasons justifying issue of a machine’.82 
 Gradually the army was supplied with greater numbers of typewriters.83 However, 
there is evidence to suggest that even during the last two years of the war some units found 
them difficult to come by. Upon finding his brigade headquarters ‘up to their necks’ in 
paperwork on the eve of the Battle of Messines, for example, one artillery officer ‘promised 
to lend them for a few days [his] private Corona Typewriter to enable them to cope with this 
flood-tide of paper’.84  Similarly, as a junior captain in 1914, James Jack noted in his diary at 
the Battle of Mons that he, along with the other battalion captains in the 19th Infantry 
Brigade, ‘write the orders dictated by the brigadier on our small Field Service notebooks (6 
by 4 inches), each making three carbon copies. These orders are shortly sent to battalions by 
their orderlies on pedal bicycles’. Four years later, as GOC 28th Infantry Brigade, Jack 
recorded the conversation he had with Herbert Plumer, GOC Second Army: ‘The General 
asks how the Brigade is getting on, and laughs – a little uncomprehendingly – when I put a 
typewriting machine as our first requirement. This is not so frivolous a request as it sounds 
[because]… manuscript is too slow for the volume of office work’.85 By the end of the war 
there were approximately 5,000 typewriters being used in the BEF, with a dedicated service 
of travelling mechanics on motorcycles and workshops in each army area to oversee 
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typewriter repair and maintenance.86 As Partridge informed the War Office in August 1918, 
typewriters had become ‘a necessity, not a convenience’.87 
 Similarly, in a series of letters written to a newly appointed battalion adjutant 
concerning the nature of his duties, an unnamed officer strongly advised that he utilise a card 
index filing system in order to cope with the influx of information that he and his office 
clerks would undoubtedly have to deal with.88 The benefits of such a system were made clear 
in a post war article:  
 
Now supposing we had a little box on our desk, about six inches by six by four; 
and we could nonchalantly turn back the lid, and flick some scores of little 
postcards therein until we came to an alphabetical index card S; and supposing 
we glanced rapidly through a dozen, or less, cards immediately behind S; we 
could in a very few seconds have a large amount of concentrated information… 
at our finger tips.89 
 
Not only did many of the BEF’s administrative and support services come to value 
card indexes,90 but certain combat elements also made effective use of them, most 
notably for counter-battery work.91 Since rapid communication to and from a variety of 
intelligence sources was paramount to the success of counter-battery fire, the 
arrangements within each corps-level Counter Battery Staff Office (CBSO) were 
‘systemized’ so that ‘several hundred items of information’ could be collected, 
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processed and disseminated in the quickest and most effective way possible.92 To this 
end, ‘suspect cards’, detailing information concerning the location of unconfirmed 
enemy batteries, were indexed and found to be a ‘quick’ and ‘infinitely preferable’ 
means of recording and storing information.93 In light of the centrality of accurate 
indirect artillery fire to the First World War RMA, it stands to reason that the IM 
techniques of the CBSO acted as a critical force enabler. 
 Other equipment deemed ‘essential’ for the efficient running of the CBSO 
included a typewriter, duplicator and telephone switchboard.94 The latter had become a 
permanent feature of British signal offices from January 1916 when one 20-line and 
one 10-line switchboard per division was authorised.95 Larger switchboards for corps 
and army headquarters were also designed, mainly as a result of the Signal Service’s 
close affiliation with the General Post Office (GPO). In all, the latter furnished the 
BEF with 36,000 switchboards and 10,000 portable exchanges, equipment deemed 
vital in terms of managing the ever-growing volume of telephone traffic.96 During the 
second week of June 1917, for example, the Canadian Corps’ 60-line exchange 
averaged between 4,000 and 5,000 calls per day, while the Australian Corps 
headquarters’ 90-line switchboard averaged 161 calls per hour throughout August 
1918.97 
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 However, improving the BEF’s IM system was not simply a matter of employing the 
latest bureau technologies but also of developing the infrastructure to deal with information 
as efficiently as possible. As the Manual of Army Signal Service – War made clear, ‘if 
messages are to be rapidly dealt with, and the several means of communication co-ordinated, 
the terminals of the message routes must be carefully organized’.98 To this end, each level of 
command established its own signal office which acted as ‘a radiating point’ to the rest of 
the army.99 The ideal signal office would group, where possible, telegraph, telephone and 
wireless operators within close proximity of each other so as to ‘greatly facilitate supervision 
and rapidity of despatch’,100 whilst despatch riders and orderlies were allotted a separate 
room so as to ‘minimise interference with office routine’.101 
 Yet, the nature of the fighting on the Western Front demonstrated ‘the impossibility 
of trying to control the day-to-day operations of small bodies of men in a shelled trench area 
from Corps or Division HQ, unless the latter are at least as near to what is going on as 
Brigade HQ’.102 Thus, orders, reports and other messages were also likely to pass through 
observation stations, advanced headquarters and report centres. Observation stations enabled 
a commander and his staff ‘to obtain a good view of the ground, over which his troops are 
working, from a position from which he can communicate his orders and instructions to his 
subordinates…, or report the progress of the fight to his superiors’.103 Perhaps the most 
notable use of observation stations occurred on 1 July 1916 when both Thomas Morland, 
GOC X Corps, and Oliver Nugent, GOC 36th Division, established forward observation posts 
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in the tops of trees from which they could observe the German lines and watch the course of 
events as they unfolded.104  
 Much greater use was made of advanced headquarters and report centres which were 
established by each formation so as ‘to facilitate the rapid transmission of information 
required for the conduct of tactical operations’.105 Their main purpose was ‘to place… 
commanders and staff in a position whence it will be easy for them to reach, or communicate 
rapidly with D.R. with, subordinate and neighbouring formations’.106 Attempts to capture 
this best practice and codify it into formal, written doctrine were made, most notably in the 
aftermath of Second Army’s success at Messines in June 1917 which owed a great deal to 
the employment of a thorough IM system, details of which provide revealing insights into 
not only how British headquarters handled information during the second half of the war but 
also how the BEF sought to learn from its experiences.107   
 At the heart of Second Army’s communications system at Messines was the 
establishment of a Forward Army Report Centre at Locre, situated approximately four miles 
from the frontline.108 The purpose of the Centre was to ensure that information from all 
available sources concerning the progress of the battle was obtained in the quickest manner 
possible and that such information was swiftly processed and disseminated to the relevant 
formations concerned.109 The Locre château was chosen on account of its central location 
and the fact that it already housed a large telephone exchange on a specially constructed 
trunk line. The Centre was therefore in direct telephonic communication with the general 
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staff office at Second Army headquarters at Cassel,110 as well as the headquarters of corps, 
RFC, artillery and anti-aircraft formations.111 Each corps also established a report centre 
which was connected both to the Army Centre and to divisional headquarters.112 
 Information was also to be obtained from runners, despatch riders and a Wireless 
Interception Section. The latter was operated by the Army Wireless Company and any 
information secured went straight to the Army Wireless Intelligence Officer and his staff, 
where messages were deciphered and the contents analysed before being made available to 
the Operations branch, who rapidly despatched the information to the formations 
concerned.113 A designated ‘dropping zone’ for messages from contact aeroplanes was also 
established within close proximity of the Report Centre. By this means, information 
concerning troop movements, including those of the enemy, could be ascertained. As 
information from these various sources arrived at the centre, ‘it was classified and an 
immediate decision made as to whom it affected; it was then forwarded or re-issued to the 
formations concerned, through Corps Centres in the case of Corps, or direct in the case of 
Corps Heavy Artillery, etc.’.114 
 Although the Report Centre was in operation for only two weeks, it demonstrated 
itself to be of great value, keeping Second Army headquarters ‘informed constantly and 
promptly of what was taking place, not only on the front, but far behind the enemy’s 
lines’.115 From Dawn till midnight on 7 June, the centre handled a total of 542 messages.116 
The Corps Report Centres were equally successful. According to a US Army Staff College 
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report in early 1918, the ‘Corps Information Centres’ at Messines ‘reduced [the] duplication 
of messages and the overloading of Signal Communications, and ensured that information 
received from all sources [was] summarised and forwarded as soon as possible to all 
concerned’.117 As one signal officer stated after the battle, ‘the extra trouble taken in 
providing the necessary organisation for quickly disseminating information… seems to have 
been fully repaid’.118 
 In a rather modest assessment of the Army Report Centre, Tim Harington, MGGS 
Second Army, informed his Fourth Army counterpart that although ‘we got great value from 
it… we really only gave it a trial at very short notice and it is capable of much 
improvement’.119 John Fowler, the Director of Army Signals, however, was more upbeat. 
Realising the contribution the Report Centre had made to Second Army’s success at 
Messines, Fowler issued a memorandum to the other armies stating that ‘a similar system 
will be required in all future operations on a large scale, and it should be taken into account 
when planning communications’.120 Copies of the report detailing the inner-workings of the 
Report Centre were also distributed throughout the army in an attempt to establish some sort 
of common practice.121 Indeed, some formations did later implement very similar IM 
systems. At the Battle of Cambrai in November 1917, for instance, Third Army headquarters 
established an ‘Information Bureau’ in order to expedite the transmission of information 
within its General Staff office.122 A similar ‘Information Bureau’ was set up in ‘a marquee 
on the lawn in front of the Headquarters offices’ of the Australian Corps prior to the Amiens 
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offensive in August 1918, where liaison officers were to ‘make all enquiries for information 
as to the progress of the operations’.123 These successes appear to have resonated with the 
BEF’s doctrine writers, for the November 1918 edition of SS.135 The Division in Attack 
made explicit reference to the use of ‘central information bureaux’ for coordinating the 
newly-formed Royal Air Force’s (RAF’s) ground support operations with artillery and tank 
formations.124 According to one former officer-turned official historian, the central 
information bureau in use by the RAF during late August 1918 ‘was a nearly perfect parallel 
to the army’s eyes registering to the army’s brain’.125 
 Despite these successes, it is clear that although attempts to instil an IM doctrine 
throughout the BEF were made, in practice it was applied unevenly and inconsistently. As 
Tim Harington informed Sir Henry Wilson in July 1918, ‘very divergent views are held and 
entirely different methods exist in the various Armies, Corps and Divisions’.126 One staff 
officer, who worked at GHQ, corps and divisional headquarters, for instance, recalled that at 
both GHQ and corps ‘we worked by lengthy precisely worded correspondence, whereas in a 
division we talked on the telephone – and there is a world of difference in the two methods’. 
Although there was some commonality, each headquarters ‘had a completely different 
method of office work’.127 The BEF’s approach towards IM, therefore, provides further 
evidence to support the argument that the army’s methods for learning, and thus its ability to 
adapt, were shaped to a considerable degree by its long-standing preference for pragmatic 
solutions, whereby codification of best practice occurred but it was left to individuals to 
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accept, reject or modify it in order to suit local conditions and individual circumstances.128 
Far from a principal source of weakness, however, this ‘cult of pragmatism, flexibility and 
an empirical approach’ played an important part in ensuring the British army defeated its 
German adversary in the summer and autumn of 1918.129 As a report by the 3rd Canadian 
Brigade Signal Section in mid-August 1918 made clear, during the course of the recent 
Battle of Amiens ‘many of our ideas were revolutionized and… for communications in open 
warfare, an absolute breakaway from trench warfare systems [was] necessary and entirely 
different methods… employed. Luckily, our signallers excelled in adaptability and… 
became accustomed to… the new era in warfare’.130 
 
Conclusion 
In a lecture given to newly appointed officers of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) in 
early 1918, Captain Stephen Walmsley, a Signal Corps instructor, stated that since ‘the 
enormous number of messages to be handled and the vital importance of many of them 
makes careful and accurate handling essential’, American officers would do well to follow 
those methods for processing information ‘which had been found necessary’ by their British 
counterparts.131 Walmsley went on to liken the BEF’s CIS ‘to the systems existing in large 
industrial organizations in the United States, where all factories, warehouses, sub-offices and 
apartments have their telephone or telegraph lines leading directly or indirectly to the head 
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offices’.132 As one junior staff officer at GHQ noted, during the last two years of the war the 
BEF was being run like ‘an up-to-date competitive business’.133 Indeed, the growing scale, 
complexity and intensity of the fighting on the Western Front forced the BEF to embrace IM 
structures, techniques and technologies that were already becoming prevalent in pre-war 
business circles. By examining the internal mechanisms that headquarters put in place for 
dealing with large volumes of information and by mapping the vertical and horizontal 
channels that information flowed through headquarters, this article has shown that as the war 
progressed British commanders sought newer and better ways to gather, process and 
disseminate information. By embracing new office technologies, such as typewriters and 
telephone switchboards, new techniques like card indexes, and by refining its IM 
infrastructure, most notably with the establishment of report centres and information 
bureaus, the BEF developed a more flexible, robust and sophisticated IM system which, 
though by no means perfect, helped pave the way for the successes of the summer and 
autumn of 1918.134 
 These findings have wider implications for our understanding of the British army’s 
ability to learn and adapt between 1914 and 1918, the nature of the supposed First World 
War RMA, and the IM challenges faced by today’s armed forces. First, the case of British 
IM during the First World War reinforces the arguments of recent historians that the BEF’s 
methods for learning were more diverse and multifaceted than hitherto thought. Attempts to 
improve IM throughout the army by sharing knowledge of the inner-workings of Second 
Army’s Report Centre at Messines in 1917, for instance, highlights the BEF’s use of ‘non-
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formal’ and ‘horizontal’ learning methods.135 However, the manner in which the subsequent 
employment of information bureaus was encapsulated in written doctrine in 1918 
demonstrates that the BEF was capable of embracing more ‘formal’, ‘vertical’ approaches as 
well.136 Undoubtedly this lack of consistency in approach and practice created difficulties, 
contributing to some of the BEF’s most notable failures. Nevertheless, although problems 
concerning the speed, reliability, capacity and integrity of its CIS persistently undermined 
British operations, on the whole the BEF’s underlying ethos fostered a diverse, flexible and 
pragmatic approach that enabled it to successfully adapt to the challenges of modern warfare. 
As one signal officer reported in August 1918, ‘an ounce of practice is far better than a ton 
of theory’.137 
 Second, a closer examination of the BEF’s CIS reveals that the BEF had a greater 
awareness of, and appreciation for, IM than historians have recognised. In fact, given that 
‘the systematic collection, processing and dissemination of information in organisations are 
core features of modernity’,138 it stands to reason that if an RMA did indeed transpire during 
the course of the war, giving birth to the ‘Modern Style of Warfare’, then it depended 
crucially upon its IM components to succeed. By 1918 the BEF had developed a relatively 
efficient CIS that was capable of transmitting and receiving large volumes of information, 
which in turn was used to coordinate successful, limited-objective, combined arms 
operations.139 But transmitting and receiving was not enough; a proficient IM system was 
also required to process the information effectively. The evidence presented here suggests 
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that the demands of fighting a modern war resulted in a general, but not universal, 
improvement in the BEF’s IM techniques, incorporating both traditional characteristics and 
revolutionary features, which in turn laid the groundwork, albeit in embryonic form, for the 
IM systems of modern armies. 
 Indeed, there is evidence to suggest a degree of continuity in the IM practices of the 
British army from the First World War through the interwar period and into the Second 
World War. The 1932 ‘Report of the Committee on the Lessons of the Great War’, for 
instance, recognised the importance of good communications and the value of having 
headquarters situated further forward so that information could reach commanders more 
quickly and that information be processed and disseminated in a speedier and more efficient 
manner.140 The subsequent 1935 Field Service Regulations stressed the need for formations 
to establish ‘signal centres’, very similar in nature to the information bureaus and report 
centres of the BEF, with the likewise aim of facilitating messages between a headquarters 
and a subordinate formation, economising in personnel and material.141 Such signal centres 
were employed to good effect during the Second World War.142 Furthermore, given that the 
AEF studied British and French fighting methods closely in order to help bring them up to 
speed in 1917-18, there are reasonable grounds for arguing that some of the IM practices of 
the BEF influenced future American practice as well.143 The US Army’s 1923 Field Service 
Regulations, for example, also stipulated the need for ‘advanced message centres’ which 
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would serve ‘as a means of economizing the number of men employed in the transmission of 
messages and increases rapidity and certainty in transmission’.144 
 With these examples in mind, third, and finally, it is hoped that this article will 
resonate with current practitioners, having provided insight into how IM was practiced by 
their predecessors one hundred years ago, and by highlighting some of the building blocks 
upon which later IM doctrine and practice was based. Although significant technological 
advances have ‘enabled greater storage and manipulation of information’ to be ‘transferred 
almost instantaneously, over greater range, in greater volume and in a variety of formats’,145 
many of the IM challenges faced by today’s armed forces, including information overload, 
interoperability and security, bare striking resemblance to those experienced by the BEF.146 
Indeed, many of the methods employed in recent years by British and American forces to 
overcome these IM challenges can trace their origins back to the First World War. In July 
2004, for example, the inability of Stanley McChrystal and Task Force 16 to send and 
receive ‘vast amounts of classified information… fast enough to make it relevant to 
targeting’, resulted in the establishment of a Situational Awareness Room in Balad, Iraq, 
which encouraged McChrystal and his team to ‘deliberately craft… work spaces to channel 
interaction, force collaboration, and ease the flow of people and information’, much like the 
report centres and information bureaus of the BEF did in 1917-18.147 
 Thus, although the First World War occurred one hundred years ago, a close 
examination of the BEF’s IM practices can reveal lessons of contemporary relevance. The 
primary lesson that can be gleaned from this case study is that a ‘one size fits all’ approach is 
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to be avoided if British and American armed forces are to reap the benefits of an effective 
IM system. The recent announcement that the British tactical communications system, 
BOWMAN, is to be replaced by an updated and more flexible Tactical Communication and 
Information Systems (TacCIS) platform, known as MORPHEUS, demonstrates the 
significance that the British armed forces attaches to providing commanders with better 
information superiority on the battlefield.148 Much like the First World War RMA, however, 
the ongoing information-based RMA will require not just the implementation of the latest 
technological advancements but also a great deal of institutional and doctrinal adaptation.149 
Given the varied and expanding roles that Western armed forces are having to perform and 
prepare for, whether they be counterinsurgency, peacekeeping and stabilisation missions in 
the Middle East and Africa, or the prospect of conventional operations on European soil,150 a 
flexible and pragmatic approach, similar to that espoused by the BEF in 1914-18, is likely to 
result in a more effective IM system capable of successfully adapting to the myriad of 
twenty-first century challenges. 
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Figure 1. Inner-working of Operations Section, General Staff Branch, GHQ, 1914151 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
151 Compiled from ‘Remarks on Staff Manual, War, 1912’, WO32/4731, TNA. 
CGS 
B.G 
Operations 
Section 
Transmission 
Officer  
(Signal 
Office) 
Situation 
Officer 
Decisions and 
instructions 
Appreciation 
and suggestions 
 
Orders, messages 
despatched 
Messages 
received from 
outside 
sources 
Orders, 
instructions, 
etc. 
Summary 
of situation 
Messages from 
subordinate and 
other commands 
through Signal 
Office 
From A and Q Branches: 
Situation as to personnel, situation as 
to ammunition, situation as to supplies 
From Reconnoitring or 
Reporting Officers: 
Personal Reports 
From Intelligence Section: 
Situation as to enemy, 
topography, etc. 
N.B. Messages 
addressed to GHQ 
which do not affect 
the General Staff are 
passed direct by the 
Transmission Officer 
to branches 
concerned. 
 34 
Bibliography 
Alberts, David S., and Richard E. Hayes, Understanding Command and Control 
(Washington: CCRP, 2006). 
Amery, L.S., The Times’ History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902, Vol. III (London: 
Sampson Low, 1902). 
Anon., ‘Complimentary Dinner to Sir Andrew Ogilvie’, Post Office Electrical Engineers’ 
Journal, 13 (1920-21), 70-71. 
Bailey, Jonathan, ‘The First World War and the Birth of Modern Warfare’, in MacGregor 
Knox and Williamson Murray (eds.), The Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300-
2050 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001), 132-53. 
Baynes, John, Morale: A Study of Men and Courage (New York: Avery, 1988). 
Beach, Jim (ed.), The Military Papers of Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Cuthbert Headlam, 1910-
1942 (Stroud: History Press for the Army Records Society, 2010).  
   (ed.), SS. 135. The Division in the Attack – 1918 (Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, 
The Occasional, No. 53, 2008).  
   ‘Issued by the General Staff: Doctrine Writing at British GHQ, 1917-1918’, War in 
History, 19/4 (2012), 464-91. 
   Haig’s Intelligence: GHQ and the German Army, 1916-1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
2013). 
Beeching, Wilfred A., Century of the Typewriter (London: Heinemann, 1974). 
Beniger, James, The Control Revolution: Technological and Economic Origins of the 
Information Society (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard UP, 1986). 
Biddle, Stephen, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle 
(Princeton: Princeton UP, 2004). 
Black, Alistair, and Rodney Brunt, ‘Information Management in Business, Libraries and 
British Military Intelligence: Towards a History of Information Management’, 
Journal of Documentation 55/4 (1999), 361-74. 
Black, Alistair, Dave Muddiman and Helen Plant, The Early Information Society: 
Information Management in Britain before the Computer (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007). 
Black, John, ‘Behind the Scenes with the Pen and Ink Corps! The Role of the Army Pay 
Services during the Great War in Maintaining the Loyalty of the Fighting Soldier and 
Preserving the Social Fabric of the United Kingdom’, War & Society 35/3 (2016), 
180-203. 
Boff, Jonathan, Winning and Losing on the Western Front: The British Third Army and the 
Defeat of Germany in 1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2012). 
Boraston, Lieutenant-Colonal J.H. (ed.), Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatches (London: Dent, 
1920). 
Broadberry, Stephen, and Sayantan Ghosal, ‘From Counting House to the Modern Office: 
Explaining Anglo-American Productivity Differences in Services, 1870-1990’, 
Journal of Economic History 62/4 (2002), 967-98. 
Brown, Ian Malcolm, British Logistics on the Western Front 1914-1919 (Westport, CT.: 
Praeger, 1998). 
Bucholz, Arden, Moltke, Schlieffen and Prussian War Planning (Oxford: Berg, 1993). 
 35 
Bullock, Mike, and Laurence A. Lyons, Missed Signals on the Western Front: How the Slow 
Adoption of Wireless Restricted British Strategy and Operations in World War I 
(Jefferson, NC.: McFarland & Company, 2010). 
Campbell-Kelly, Martin, ‘The Railway Clearing House and Victorian Data Processing’, in 
Lisa Bud-Frierman (ed.), Information Acumen: The Understanding and Use of 
Knowledge in Modern Business (London: Routledge, 1994), 51-74. 
   ‘Data Processing and Technological Change: The Post Office Savings Bank, 1861-1930’, 
Technology and Culture 39/1 (1998), 1-32. 
   ‘Information Technology and Organisational Change in the British Census, 1801-1911’, in 
JoAnne Yates and John Van Maanen (eds.), Information Technology and 
Organizational Transformation: History, Rhetoric, and Practice (London: Sage, 
2001), 35-58. 
Cane, Colonel Hubert du, (trans.), The War in South Africa: the Advance to Pretoria after 
Paardeberg, the Upper Tugela Campaign, etc. Prepared in the Historical Section of 
the Great General Staff, Berlin (London: John Murray, 1906). 
Carter, General Sir Nicholas, ‘Dynamic Security Threats and the British Army’ (Speech 
Given at the Royal United Services Institute, 22 January 2018), < 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/dynamic-security-threats-and-the-british-
army-chief-of-the-general-staff-general-sir-nicholas-carter-kcb-cbe-dso-adc-gen >. 
Cassis, Youssef, Big Business: The European Experience in the Twentieth Century (Oxford: 
Oxford UP, 1997). 
Charteris, Brigadier-General John, At GHQ (London: Cassell, 1931). 
CIX, ‘Letters to an Adjutant’, Army Quarterly, 8/1-2 (1924), 31-44, 274-85. 
Collins, Jeffrey, and Andrew Futter (eds.), Reassessing the Revolution in Military Affairs: 
Transformation, Evolution and Lessons Learnt (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). 
Cutlack, F.M., The Australian Flying Corps in the Western and Eastern Theatres of War 
1914-1918 (Sydney: Halstead Press, 1923). 
Dandeker, Christopher, Surveillance, Power and Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994). 
Edgerton, David, Science, Technology and the British Industrial ‘Decline’, 1870-1970 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996). 
Edmonds, J.E., Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1916, Vol. 1 (London: HMSO, 
1932). 
   Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1917, Vol. 2 (London: HMSO, 1948). 
Evans, Major Paul W., ‘Strategic Signal Communication: A Study of Signal Communication 
as Applied to Large Field Forces, Based Upon the Operations of the German Signal 
Corps During the March on Paris in 1914’, Signal Corps Bulletin 82 (1935), 24-58. 
Farrell, Theo, ‘The Dynamics of British Military Transformation’, International Affairs 84/4 
(2008), 777-807. 
Farrell, Theo, Sten Rynning and Terry Terriff, Transforming Military Power Since the Cold 
War: Britain, France, and the United States, 1991-2012 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
2013). 
Foley, Robert T., ‘A Case Study in Horizontal Military Innovation: The German Army, 
1916-1918’, Journal of Strategic Studies 35/6 (2012), 799-827. 
   ‘Dumb Donkeys or Cunning Foxes? Learning in the British and German Armies during the 
Great War’, International Affairs 90/2 (2014), 279-98. 
 36 
Fox, Aimée, Learning to Fight: Military Innovation and Change in the British Army, 1914-
1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2018). 
Fraser-Tytler, Neil, Field Guns in France (London: Hutchinson, 1922). 
French, David, The British Way in Warfare, 1688-2000 (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990). 
French, David, and Brian Holden Reid (eds.), The British General Staff: Reform and 
Innovation, 1890-1939 (London: Routledge, 2002). 
Gardner, Nikolas, Trial by Fire: Command and the British Expeditionary Force in 1914 
(Westport, CT.: Praeger, 2003). 
General Staff, War Office, Staff Manual (War) (London: General Staff, War Office, 1912). 
   Field Service Regulations Part I: Operations (1909) (Reprinted, with Amendments, 
October 1914) (London: General Staff, War Office, 1914). 
   Field Service Regulations Part II: Organization and Administration (1909) (Reprinted, 
with Amendments, October 1914) (London: General Staff, War Office, 1914). 
   Field Service Regulations, Vol. II. Operations (London: HMSO, 1935). 
   Manual of Army Signal Service – War (Provisional) (London: HMSO, 1914). 
Godfrey, Simon, British Army Communications in the Second World War: Lifting the Fog of 
Battle (London: Bloomsbury, 2013). 
Goldman, Emily O., (ed.), Information and Revolutions in Military Affairs (London: 
Routledge, 2005). 
Graham, Dominick and Shelford Bidwell, Coalitions, Politicians and Generals: Some 
Aspects of Command in Two World Wars (London: Brassey’s, 1993). 
Gray, Colin S., Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of 
History (London: Routledge, 2004). 
Griffith, Paddy, Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army’s Art of Attack 1916-
18 (London: Yale UP, 1994). 
“GSO” [Frank Fox], GHQ (Montreuil-sur-Mer) (London: Philip Allan, 1920). 
Gwilliam, Lieutenant W.J., ‘A Signal Master on Active Service’. Post Office Electrical 
Engineers’ Journal, 8 (1915-16), 262-3. 
Hall, Brian N., Communications and British Operations on the Western Front, 1914-1918 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2017). 
Hanson, Neil, with Tom Priestley (eds.), Priestley’s Wars (Ilkley: Great Northern Books, 
2008). 
Harington, Charles, Plumer of Messines (London: John Murray, 1935). 
Harris, J.P., Douglas Haig and the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2008). 
Harris. J.P., with Niall Barr, Amiens to the Armistice: The BEF in the One Hundred Days’ 
Campaign, 8 August-11 November 1918 (London: Brassey’s, 1998). 
Harris, Paul, The Men Who Planned the War: A Study of the Staff of the British Army on the 
Western Front, 1914-1918 (London: Ashgate, 2016). 
Higgs, Edward, The Information State in England (London: Palgrave, 2004). 
Hildebrand, Brigadier-General A.B.R., ‘Second Army Signals, 1914: From the Personal 
Diary of Brigadier-General A.B.R. Hildebrand’, Royal Signals Quarterly Journal 
6/21 (1938), 129-41. 
Hinton, Matthew (ed.), Introducing Information Management: the Business Approach 
(Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2005). 
Hogan, Jr., David W., A Command Post at War: First Army Headquarters in Europe, 1943-
1945 (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2000). 
 37 
Inglefield, Captain V.E., The History of the Twentieth (Light) Division (London: Nisbet, 
1921). 
Jones, H.A., The War in the Air: Being the Story of the Part Played in the Great War by the 
Royal Air Force, Vol. 6 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928). 
Journal of Strategic Studies 33/4 (2010), Special Issue: The Information Technology 
Revolution in Military Affairs. 
Joyce, Patrick, The State of Freedom: A Social History of the British State since 1800 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2013). 
Marble, Sanders, British Artillery on the Western Front in the First World War (London: 
Routledge, 2013). 
McChrystal, General Stanley, My Share of the Task: A Memoir (New York: 
Portfolio/Penguin, 2014). 
McNaughton, Brigadier-General A.G.L., ‘Counter Battery Work’, Canadian Defence 
Quarterly, 3/4 (1926), 380-91. 
Micklam, Lieutenant G.V., ‘The Personal Card Index, or Moderated Methodism’, Royal 
Engineers Journal, 43 (1929), 636-7. 
Mitchinson, K.W., The Territorial Force at War, 1914-16 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2014). 
Musgrave, Captain H., ‘The Army System of Correspondence’, Royal Engineers Journal 2/1 
(1905), 47-51. 
Nalder, Major-General R.F.H., The Royal Corps of Signals: A History of its Antecedents and 
Development, 1800-1955 (London: Royal Signals Institution, 1958). 
Nicholson, Colonel W.N., Behind the Lines: An Account of Administrative Staff Work in the 
British Army 1914-1918 (London: Strong Oak Press, 1989). 
Norberg, Arthur L., ‘High Technology Calculation in the Early 20th Century: Punched Card 
Machinery in Business and Government’, Technology and Culture 31/4 (1990), 753-
79. 
Orbell, John, ‘The Development of Office Technology’, in Alison Turton (ed.), Managing 
Business Archives (London: Butterworth-Heinrmann, 1991), 60-83. 
Palazzo, Albert, ‘The British Army’s Counter-Battery Staff Office and Control of the Enemy 
in World War 1’, Journal of Military History, 63/1 (1999), 55-74. 
Passingham, Ian, Pillars of Fire: the Battle of Messines Ridge, June 1917 (Stroud: Sutton, 
1998). 
Perry, Nicholas (ed.), Major-General Oliver Nugent and the Ulster Division 1915-1918 
(Stroud: Sutton, 2007). 
Philpott, William, ‘Military History a Century after the Great War’, Revue Française de 
Civilisation Britannique [Online] 20/1 (2015), 2-3, < https://rfcb.revues.org/288 >. 
Priestley, J.B., Margin Released: A Writer’s Reminiscences and Reflections (London: 
Mercury Books, 1962). 
Priestley, R.E., Work of the Royal Engineers in the European War, 1914-19: The Signal 
Service (France) (first published 1921; new ed., Uckfield: The Naval and Military 
Press Ltd., 2006). 
Prior, Robin and Trevor Wilson, Command on the Western Front: The Military Career of Sir 
Henry Rawlinson, 1914-1918 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992). 
Raines, Rebecca Robbins, Getting the Message Through: A Branch History of the US Army 
Signal Corps (Washington, D.C.: Centre of Military History, 1999). 
 38 
Rawling, Bill, ‘Communications in the Canadian Corps, 1915-1918: Wartime Technological 
Progress Revisited’, Canadian Military History 3/2 (1994), 6-21. 
Robbins, Simon, British Generalship on the Western Front 1914-18: Defeat into Victory 
(London: Frank Cass, 2005). 
Ryan, Sean, ‘Finding the Right Answer: Adapting Military Intelligence to the Information 
Age’, RUSI Journal 160/4 (2015), 50-8.  
Scott, Peter T. (ed.), ‘The View from GHQ: The Second Part of the War Diary of General 
Sir Charles Deedes’, Stand To! Journal of the Western Front Association 11 (1984), 
6-17. 
Sheffield, Gary and John Bourne (eds.), Douglas Haig War Diaries and Letters 1914-1918 
(London: Phoenix, 2006). 
Sheffield, Gary, ‘Doctrine and Command in the British Army: An Historical Overview’, E-2, 
in Army Doctrine Publication (ADP). Operations (2010), < 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/33695
/ADPOperationsDec10.pdf >. 
Simkins, Peter, Kitchener’s Army: The Raising of the New Armies 1914-1916 (Manchester: 
Manchester UP, 1988). 
Speight, Captain A., ‘G.H.Q. Signal Office, France’, Post Office Electrical Engineers’ 
Journal 13 (1920-21), 52-5. 
Spiel, Brad, ‘Less is More: The Enabled Combat Brigade Headquarters’ (5 January 2018), < 
https://groundedcuriosity.com/less-is-more-the-enabled-combat-brigade-
headquarters/ >.  
Spiers, Edward, The Late Victorian Army 1868-1902 (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1992). 
Storr, Jim, The Human Face of War (London: Continuum, 2009). 
Terraine, John (ed.), General Jack’s Diary: War on the Western Front 1914-1918 (London: 
Cassell, 2001). 
Thompson, Bill (ed.), General Sir Thomas Morland: War Diaries & Letters, 1914-1918 
(Kibworth Beauchamp: Matador, 2015). 
Todman, Dan, ‘The Grand Lamasery Revisited: General Headquarters on the Western Front, 
1914-1918’, in Gary Sheffield and Dan Todman (eds.), Command and Control on the 
Western Front: The British Army’s Experience 1914-18 (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 
2004), 39-70. 
UK Ministry of Defence, JCN 2/12, Future Land Operating Concept (May 2012). 
   JDP 6-00 (Third Edition), Communications and Information Systems Support to Joint 
Operations (January 2008). 
   ‘Morpheus Programme: Next Generation Tactical Communication Information Systems 
for Defence’, last updated 18 April 2018, <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/morpheus-
project-next-generation-tactical-communication-information-systems-for-defence>. 
US Department of Defence, Joint Publication 6-0, Joint Communications System (June 
2015), < http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp6_0.pdf >. 
US War Department, Field Service Regulations, United States Army, 1923 (Washington 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1924).  
van Creveld, Martin, Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to the Present (New York: Free 
Press, 1989). 
War Office, Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire, 1914-1920 (London: 
HMSO, 1922). 
 39 
Yates, JoAnne, Control through Communication: The Rise of System in American 
Management (Baltimore: John Hopkins UP, 1993). 
   ‘Evolving Information Use in Firms, 1850-1920: Ideology and Information Techniques 
and Technologies’, in Lisa Bud-Frierman (ed.), Information Acumen: The 
Understanding and Use of Knowledge in Modern Business (London: Routledge, 
1994), 26-50. 
 
